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The Obama administration’sCash for Clunkers program
hasn’t been extended despite the
consumption of the entire amount
appropriated during the single
month of July 2009. While opin-
ions may vary with respect to the
success achieved by this novel
program, some historical perspec-
tive on alternative, targeted, and
stimulus-based strategies may
warrant review.
Early History of Depreciation
During the early years of U.S.
corporate (starting 1909) and
individual (starting 1913) taxa-
tion, little guidance existed for 
the selection of appropriate
depreciable lives for capital assets.
Following passage of the 16th
Amendment (February 25, 1913),
specific guidelines still weren’t
imposed for the useful lives of
assets (or classes of assets) to
compute depreciation deductions
and taxable income. The U.S.
Treasury Department refused to
announce or approve any fixed
rates of depreciation, properly
holding that the rate must in each
case depend on the “facts and cir-
cumstances” and that any pro-
posed rates were merely suggestive
of the proper allowance for physi-
cal exhaustion—not including
obsolescence—under average
conditions.
In 1920, the Treasury Depart-
ment’s Bureau of Internal Rev-
enue first published Bulletin “F,”
revised in 1928, 1931, 1942, and
1955. It provided taxpayers with
the current “practice” or “trend
and tendency” for the depreciable
lives for various classes of assets.
The determination of the appro-
priate depreciable life and/or
method remained a matter of tax-
payer judgment.
The post-1961 period marked
the initial steps toward increas-
ingly restrictive “guidance” to the
taxpayer. It began with the reserve
ratio (RR; 1962-70), followed by
the class-life asset depreciation
range (CLADR, 1971-80). The RR
test provided the taxpayer with
the means of computing an
“upper limit” for annual deprecia-
tion charges. The CLADR system
provided both upper and lower
limits for depreciation and sug-
gested guideline periods for
depreciable lives, as well as annual
repair allowance percentages.
Reagan Administration 
Tax Policy
The Reagan administration (1981-
1989) used supply-side, trickle-
down economics, lower tax rates,
and shorter depreciable lives for
long-lived assets to stimulate
demand for automobiles (three
years) under the Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act (ERTA81). In 1986, the
brakes were put on the plan with
the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86) by increasing the depre-
ciable lives for automobiles to six
years (as a result of the half-year
convention). This legislation led to
increased automobile sales in
December 1986 and decreased
sales in January through March
1987 because small businesses, in
anticipation of modified ACRS
(MACRS) rules, accelerated their
purchase of vehicles sales that
might have otherwise been made
during the first quarter of 1987
under the accelerated cost recovery
system (ACRS). Taxpayers rushed
to make early purchases and lock
in the three-year depreciable life
for their business-use automobiles.
Figure 1 summarizes the entire
U.S. history of depreciable lives for
business-use vehicles (1913-2009).
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Will Cash for Clunkers
“Trickle Up”?Even though the funds for theCash for Clunkers program were
consumed in a single month, the
program wasn’t extended. While
it’s still too early to gauge
whether the program was a
success, it may be helpful to
place the program within a
proper historical context.
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Reagan’s Supply-Side Trickle-
Down Theory
ERTA81 introduced ACRS for
assets placed in service after 1980,
replacing the CLADR and “facts
and circumstances” depreciation
methods. Depreciable lives of
assets were no longer a function of
a CLADR but were determined by
law or by “statute.” ACRS provided
“cost recovery.” For the first time
in history, tax depreciation policy
no longer attempted to match the
useful life of an asset to the
accounting period benefiting from
its use for tax purposes. This was a
significant event, with economic,
fiscal, and economic governmental
objectives now preempting
accounting practice and tax regu-
lations. The investment tax credit
and the IRC §179 expensing elec-
tion (starting in 1982), designed to
replace its predecessor—bonus
depreciation (1958-1980)—
stimulated demand for automo-
biles, among other long-lived
assets. The IRC §179 expense elec-
tion had an “investment ceiling”
designed to ensure that only small
businesses benefitted.
MACRS (which began in 1987)
provided for longer depreciable
lives for most assets. Congress was
more concerned at that time with
raising revenues than with stimu-
lating the economy. Again, it was
politics and not accuracy in
accounting that drove the policy.
Longer recovery periods for
MACRS and the listed property
limitations resulted in significantly
slower depreciation than ACRS
and, therefore, a higher taxable
income each year. Taxpayer antici-
pation of a longer depreciable life
for automobiles led to increased
December 1986 unit sales, with
the elimination of the sales tax
credit also serving to stimulate
demand for the nonbusiness auto-
mobile segment. This December
1986 deadline, however, robbed
sales from the first three to four
months of 1987 as increased late-
1986 sales represented accelerated
purchase decisions by all classes of
taxpayers.
How Does Cash for Clunkers
Differ?
The Obama administration’s Cash
for Clunkers program appears to
have been a huge success, but it
hasn’t been extended. The $1 bil-
lion (less $50 million for adminis-
tration) divided by a maximum
subsidy of $4,500 per vehicle
appears to have resulted in a mini-
mum increase of 210,000 unit
sales for July 2009 ($950 million /
$4,500). The program required
disclosure of the scrap value of the
trade-in to purchasers of new
vehicles and required the destruc-
tion of these less-fuel-efficient
engines and drive trains.
The other difference between
the Obama and Reagan solutions
is the cash flow impact. Under the
Cash for Clunkers program, the
cash outflow and additional U.S.
debt increase or impact were
immediate. The Reagan adminis-
tration’s traditional fiscal-policy-
based approach deferred the cash
outflow (in the form of a reduc-
tion in future tax revenue inflows)
and, therefore, the immediate
need for additional liquidity and
borrowings from China, Russia,
Brazil, and other international
trading partners already con-
cerned about increasing debt lev-
els maintained by the U.S.
Did Cash for Clunkers Succeed?
The efficiency and effectiveness of
the Cash for Clunkers program
will be examined and reexamined
for years. In terms of a market
reaction, the fact that the entire
appropriated amount was con-
sumed in a single month (July
2009) suggests success because the
desired reaction was achieved.
Cash for Clunkers sales were tar-
geted to stimulate demand from
consumers. On one hand, it did.
On the other hand, it has a long-
term benefit of lower energy
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Figure 1. Depreciable Lives for Business Use 
Automobiles, 1913–2009
 
consumption, which may or may
not be realized. The program cer-
tainly requires, and undoubtedly
will receive, further examination—
and in an historical context. SF
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